


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
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
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16 October 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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3. USSR: 22nd party congress to begin in Moscow tomorrow.  
(Page ii)

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4. Egypt: Pilots and crews reportedly were sent to USSR in September to begin training on TU-16 bombers and MIG-21 fighters. (Page ii)



6. Ruanda-Urundi: Assassination of new Urundi prime minister removes a moderating influence in Urundi. (Page iii)
7. France-Algeria: French security officials expect early move by Secret Army Organization in Algeria. (Page iv)
8. Trinidad: Premier Eric Williams privately threatens to repudiate US-West Indies Federation Bases Agreement.  
(Page iv)
9. Ecuador: Further labor violence expected. (Page v)



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USSR-Egypt: The USSR may have agreed to provide Egypt with additional combat jet aircraft under the arms aid pact concluded this summer in Moscow. Egyptian pilots and crews were sent to the USSR in September, reportedly to begin training on TU-16 bombers and MIG-21 fighters which are scheduled to be

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[ ] delivered to Egypt in early 1962. Preparations now are under way to improve the runways at the Cairo West airport, reportedly to accommodate the TU-16s. Indonesia already has received TU-16s from the USSR and is also scheduled to be provided with MIG-21s in 1962. [ ]

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
[ ] Ruanda-Urundi: The assassination of the new Urundi prime minister, Prince Louis Rwagasore, son of the traditional ruler Mwami Mwabutsa, removes a moderating influence in Urundi and probably signals increased pressures for an early end to the Belgian trusteeship as well as closer alignment with the more radical African states. Ambassador Gullion has reported that the assassination has created a "tinder box situation" and that most Africans believe the assassin was a Belgian. [ ] Vice Premier Ngendandumwe, a moderate, is technically in line to succeed Rwagasore, but André Muhirwa, minister of [ ]

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[redacted] interior and son-in-law of the Mwami, appears to be the more likely successor. Muhirwa heads the extreme nationalist wing of Rwagasore's party, the Union for the National Interest of Urundi (UPRONA), which won overwhelmingly in the Urundi legislative elections held on 18 September in preparation for independence in 1962. Rwagasore's removal may also provoke clashes between the traditionally hostile ethnic groups, the ruling Tutsi minority and the Hutu peasant majority. [redacted]

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[redacted] (Map)

\*France-Algeria: [redacted] reportedly now are in substantial agreement in expecting an early attempt by the anti-De Gaulle Secret Army Organization (OAS) to seize control of Algiers and Oran. [redacted] there may be some initial OAS successes, but are confident the French army will quickly and successfully put down the revolt. The morale of the French security forces has been increased by their recent success in silencing the clandestine OAS radio in Algiers and the capture of an OAS assassination squad, as well as by the Spanish government's internment of some OAS leaders in Spain. The effectiveness of the OAS, however, probably has not been seriously weakened by these developments. The OAS may feel under pressure to speed up its coup attempt because its indiscriminate terrorism has begun to alienate many of the European settlers it counts on for mass demonstrations to overwhelm the police. [redacted]

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Trinidad: Trinidad's Premier Eric Williams has privately threatened to repudiate the February 1961 US-West Indies Federation Bases Agreement. Fearful lest he lose the general election in Trinidad, tentatively scheduled for November, Williams alleged to a British official that Washington is welshing on aid commitments. Williams implied that Jamaica's forthcoming secession from the Federation could legally require renegotiation of the bases agreement. [redacted] Jamaican withdrawal from the Federation and the consequent ending of Jamaica's financial contribution to the Federation are also likely to increase pressure for renegotiation of agreements [redacted]

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with the US in St. Lucia and Antigua, where important missile-tracking and space research facilities are located. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] (Backup, Page 5) (Map)

Ecuador: A truce, which may last only a few days, was declared on 11 October in most areas of Ecuador affected by the Communist-leftist led general strike initiated on 4 October. President Velasco and other government representatives are visiting these areas to discuss strike demands, and a continuation of the truce will depend on prompt government action. Immediate satisfaction of the strikers' demands, however, is economically impossible for the Ecuadorean regime without outside support; the US Embassy in Quito believes that disturbances will recur when the strikers realize this.

Armed Forces Chief General Aulestia told Velasco on 9 October that the outbreaks are aided and financed by the Soviet bloc through Cuba and that their objective is to force the President's resignation and his replacement by pro-leftist Vice President Arosemena. Aulestia told the President that he should not resign and that the armed forces would "do all in their power to prevent a forced resignation." According to the general, Velasco agreed to issue immediately directives to restrain the flow of Communist funds, agitators, and propaganda into Ecuador. [REDACTED]

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
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
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Urundi Prime Minister Assassinated

Belgian officials in Urundi were reported "stunned" when Rwagasore's UPRONA party won 58 of the 64 seats in the 18 September legislative elections. UPRONA stands for the maintenance of the Tutsi hierarchy under the Mwami, and it plumped for Urundi independence this year to ensure continuing Tutsi control. UPRONA leaders, despite their feudal inclinations, have been supported by the more radical African states as an anti-Belgian group. Belgian authorities in Urundi openly supported the Front Commun, a party formed from a rival Tutsi clan and Hutus; it advocated a democratization of Urundi institutions prior to independence. The Front Commun won the elections in 1960 and until recently constituted the Urundi government.

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[redacted] Rwagasore's postelection statements indicated he was trying to steer UPRONA on a moderate course. He told [redacted] UPRONA's theme of "independence in 1961" was campaign propaganda and that he would settle for independence in December 1962. He gave assurances he wanted the Belgians to stay and was planning a trip to Brussels to seek financial assistance. Rwagasore wanted to form a government with equal numbers of Tutsis and Hutus, and tried unsuccessfully to include members of the Front Commun. He and his father had begun plans for a visit to the United States in November.

The traditional hostility in Ruanda-Urundi between the Tutsis and the Hutus, who comprise over 80 percent of the population of the area as a whole, had been muted in Urundi. In Ruanda, encouraged by the Belgians, the Hutus have completely eliminated the Tutsis from power, won absolute control in the legislative elections on 25 September, and by referendum ended the institution of the Mwami. [redacted] the Hutu party in Ruanda, the PARMEHUTU, had started a campaign to "deliver our Hutu brothers in Urundi from serfdom" and that PARMEHUTU agitators had gone to Urundi to contact Hutu members of UPRONA. It is possible that Rwagasore may have been killed by a Hutu from Ruanda, although dissidents in UPRONA

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[redacted]

or in the losing Front Commun may have been responsible. If the killer is identified as connected with the Front Commun or with the Ruanda PARMEHUTU or as a Belgian settler, serious clashes and violence are likely not only in Urundi but also between Ruanda and Urundi. Postelection violence is continuing in Ruanda between Hutus and Tutsis. Belgian forces in the area were bolstered prior to the elections and now total 2,500.

The present 16th UN General Assembly is scheduled to discuss developments in Ruanda-Urundi, probably in November. If serious violence does occur, pressures from the Afro-Asian states for UN intervention will probably be strong. [redacted]

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[redacted]  
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### West Indies May Seek Revision of Bases Agreement

[Premier Eric Williams had assumed that the aid the US promised in connection with the bases agreement was a quid pro quo for his postponing for 17 years his claims regarding the Chaguaramas naval base and radar research facility. He has apparently interpreted the US promise to assist with five projects totaling at least \$25,000,000--for port facilities, roads, swamp reclamation, railway rehabilitation, and development of a college of arts and sciences--as a commitment to assume all costs. He is incensed over what he considers undue procedural details in implementing the aid offer and over what he terms the small scale of the proposed grants.]

[Some candidates have already announced themselves for the elections; no definite date has yet been set. Williams is bad tempered because he believes that these elections may upset his previous complete control over the island. Although he so far feels obliged to defend publicly the agreement he signed in February as advantageous to Trinidad, the opposition Democratic Labor party's charges--that the US should release more land from Chaguaramas than is specified in the agreement, train local personnel at the base and in the US, and employ more local labor--will impel Williams to demonstrate the positive benefits of the base in the form of US aid. With his propensity to seek scapegoats, Williams is likely to make a campaign issue over what he considers inadequate performance by the US on aid offers and thus build up pressure for subsequent demands for renegotiation of the agreement.]

[British officials believe that after the election, Williams will probably decide to fragment the West Indies Federation further by seeking separate independence for Trinidad, which they will be obliged to grant. If thus deprived of the financial support of both Jamaica--which will secede in 1962--and Trinidad, the nonviable smaller islands will have to rely on the US and the UK for financial support and are likely to seize on a renegotiation of the bases agreement as the best bargaining device. Williams has]

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[implied that if sufficiently bolstered by foreign aid, he might agree to lead a smaller federation without Jamaica.]

[Commenting on the West Indies Federation during a stop in Trinidad while en route to the US, British Guiana's Premier Cheddi Jagan said on 11 October that his country would continue to participate in West Indies regional services as long as they are mutually advantageous. He said he would not join the Federation, however, unless it took on what he termed a "socialist orientation," with ownership of the means of production in the hands of the state.]

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